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Mateo J. Carrillo

Migrant Flows: Hydraulic
Infrastructure, Agricultural
Industrialization, and
Environmental Change in
Western Mexico, 1940–64
Abstract
This article explores the relationship between the growth
of irrigation works, environmental change, and rural migration in western Mexico from 1940 to 1964. It begins by analyzing how Mexico’s expansion of hydraulic infrastructure
facilitated the transfer of industrial agricultural technology
through the US-based Rockefeller Foundation. USsponsored technical assistance programs privileged irrigation- and input-intensive production, undermining traditional Mexican land tenure and agriculture regimes while
industrializing and privatizing natural resources. These processes altered rural livelihoods and landscapes in western
Mexico, intensifying migratory ﬂows already ampliﬁed by
the Bracero Program. By examining the origins of western
Mexico’s deeply rooted culture of migration through an
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environmental and technical lens, this article reframes conventional socioeconomic and political understandings of
Mexican migrancy, revealing the essential roles of the natural and built environments in the growth of a mass phenomenon that dominates US-Mexican relations today.

INTRODUCTION
Scholars of migration, technology, and environment have overlooked the impact of hydraulic infrastructure on rural Mexican migration to the United States from 1940 to 1964. The growth of
transnational Mexican migrancy not only occurred during a transformative period in the relationship between the Mexican state, people,
and space, but it was also profoundly shaped by this reorientation.
Beginning in World War II, Mexican planners and engineers (tecnicos)
prioritized the building of roads that linked national production and
consumption centers, the expansion of irrigation works, and the migration of people out of Mexico’s densely populated central-west region. The country’s rapid modernization fueled dramatic changes in
traditional agricultural regimes, land use patterns, rural perceptions
of natural resources, and the environment itself. In official government rhetoric, infrastructure like hydraulic works charted the modern path to spatial and upward mobility, social justice, and political
and economic integration.1
In reality, hydraulic technology fueled both progress and egress in
Mexico. Official efforts to store, manage, distribute, and commodify
water—a fundamental tenet of post-1940 modernization—increased
rural spatial mobility and socioeconomic inequality. Proportionally,
the rise in value of irrigation works on Jalisco’s largest private and
communal (ejido) farms mirrored the rise in legal Mexican laborers in
the United States between 1940 and 1964 (figure 1). The majority of
n, states in western
these braceros originated in Jalisco and Michoaca
Mexico. And since tecnicos believed “irrigation only makes sense
where roads exist,” new transportation networks were intrinsically
linked to new water networks. New highways, bus transportation,
and bracero recruitment centers lining Mexico’s Pacific coast shifted
traditional western Mexican migration routes away from Texas to
California while intensifying migrant flows (figure 2). Fatefully, the
development of Mexican water and road infrastructure facilitated the
importation of an agricultural regime that radically altered rural landscapes and migrancy. Postwar development, predicated on infrastructure and industrialization, transformed Mexico into a nation of
emigrants as agrarian Mexicans (campesinos) left the countryside in
droves.2
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Figure 1. Total value of Jalisco irrigation works by decade and total number of bracero admissions to the
United States in decade increments, 1940–64. Credit: Graph by author, derived from Segundo censo
agrıcola-ganadero y ejidal, resumen general, 1940; Tercer censo agrıcola-ganadero y ejidal, resumen
general, 1950; Cuarto censo agrıcola-ganadero y ejidal, resumen general, 1960; and Manuel Garcıa y
nica Verea Campos, M
n de indocumentados
Griego and Mo
exico y Estados Unidos frente a la migracio
noma de M
(Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Auto
exico, 1988), 116–17.

The expansion of post-1940 Mexican irrigation and migration networks traced its origins, in part, to wheat and corn fields in the midwestern United States during the 1920s and 1930s. There, US
scientists and farmers developed the methods and inputs for largescale, mechanized, and industrialized agriculture. In Mexico, too, the
1930s inaugurated a transformative era for the nation’s traditional
land tenure regimes. Agrarian reform, inspired by the radical tenets of
the Mexican Revolution (1910–20), was mandated by the 1917
Constitution. Yet it was unevenly implemented until the presidency
zaro Ca
rdenas (1934–40), who oversaw the massive reorganizaof La
tion of Mexican land and the “radical redistribution” of water via the
expansion of minor works, like small reservoirs. Unlike US farms,
Mexican agriculture in the 1930s remained largely rain fed in many
states, especially Jalisco, and industrial inputs were minimal. One national irrigation map from 1937, however, hinted at the emerging interrelationship between hydraulic and human mobility. As pencil
lines linked regional water projects, a brief note stated: “Put roads between irrigation districts.” By 1938, nearly twenty bus lines serviced
Guadalajara, Mexico’s second largest city and the capital of Jalisco.
rdenas’s nationalization of US-owned properties and natAlthough Ca
ural resources generated friction with the United States, US-Mexican
tensions had eased by the outbreak of World War II. A new spirit of
mutual assistance merged the two nations’ agricultural
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Figure 2. The Mexican highway network by decade, 1930–60 (circle indicates central-west Mexico). The
Bracero Program (1942–64), in conjunction with the new highway infrastructure, shifted traditional
Mexican migration routes away from Texas to California, where the majority of braceros were sent. In
1920, California received 22 percent of Mexican migrants. This figure increased to 53 percent by 1970.
See Douglas Massey, Jorge Durand, and Nolan Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican
Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2003), 58–59.
Credit: Map by author, based on maps found in Bernardo Garcıa Martınez, Las carreteras de M
exico,
1891–1991 (Mexico City: Secretarıa de Comunicaciones y Transportes, 1992).

modernization and land reform projects through the Mexican
Agricultural Program (MAP).3

MOBILIZING WATER AND MIGRANTS
World War II initiated a major shift in Mexico’s political economy.
rdenas’s domestically focused and redistribuMoving away from Ca
tive policies, the state took a conservative turn, embracing USMexican cooperation and economic expansion. This shift, initiated

by President Manuel Avila
Camacho (1940–46), was clearly manifested through the creation of two, pivotal binational programs: the
Bracero Program (1942–64), a series of agreements governing the recruitment of Mexican workers for US agriculture and industry, and
MAP (1943–61), known within Mexico as the Oficina de Estudios
Especiales. Administered by the US-based Rockefeller Foundation and
Mexico’s agriculture secretary, MAP aimed to increase Mexican grain
production through agricultural technology, particularly irrigation,
and train Mexican scientists in modern agriculture. As the prominent
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tecnico Adolfo Orive Alba declared, irrigation represented the “most
important and effective material tool to stimulate agriculture in
Mexico.” Shaped by the deficiencies of 1930s Mexican land reform,
which had resulted in poor crop production and increased dependence on grain imports, MAP founded experimental camps throughout Mexico utilizing hybrid seed, fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation, and
machinery. At the time, the majority of Mexican farms were small
scale, rain fed, and unmechanized. With US farms hard-pressed to
supply Mexico with grain while feeding Allied troops, leading technocrats on both sides of the border embraced the Rockefeller
Foundation’s assistance in Mexican agriculture.4
The Rockefeller Foundation’s plan to increase production in
Mexico was based on the US model. In the United States, average
farm size had increased by 10 percent from 1930 to 1940, with the
greatest growth in the “large farm” category. In 1943, the year that
MAP began, the major trend in US agriculture, according to officials,
was “greater commercialization” with “more emphasis on production
for sale and less emphasis on production for home consumption.” US
officials also acknowledged that “unemployment and underemployment [could] be extreme and annual earnings very low” for agricultural workers in commercial, large-scale, and mechanized regimes.
And, once inside Mexico, MAP experts trained in US wheat fields privileged wheat research over corn research on experimental farms in
central-west Mexico. This stood in stark contrast to Mexican agricultural practices. Most campesinos grew traditional rain-fed staples such
as native (criollo) corn and beans on small plots and primarily for
home consumption, while wheat required substantive irrigation and
chemical inputs inaccessible to most Mexican farmers.5
Even before MAP’s inception, the Rockefeller Foundation viewed
existing Mexican land tenure as a barrier to progress, reflecting the
opinion of many Mexican officials and technocrats. After touring rural Mexico in 1941 in search of strategies to expand crop production,
Rockefeller Foundation agronomists concluded that the primary factor impeding agricultural modernization was a lack of irrigation—a
capital-intensive technology beyond the reach of most campesinos.
Meanwhile, wartime Mexican exports and trade boomed, underscoring the profitability of increased yields while intensifying economic
pressures on both private smallholdings and ejidos. This process cast
the nation’s traditional land tenure regimes as backward.
Consequently, traditional agricultural practices and regions were targeted by the government for modernization. Western Mexico, home
to the nation’s largest corn-producing state of Jalisco, and
n, a major wheat-producing state, were foremost in the biMichoaca
national technocrats’ plans.6
In western Mexico, new hydraulic works tended to increase social
n’s Tuxpan irrigation
conflict and resource inequality. In Michoaca
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Figure 3. Left image: Mexican hydrological regions, with the Lerma-Santiago hydrological basin outlined
in red. Right inset: The course of the Lerma and Santiago Rivers within the Lerma-Santiago hydrological
basin (note Lake Chapala on the Jalisco-Michoac
an border). Credit: Map by author, based on maps
n Estatal del Agua Jalisco (https://www.ceajalisco.gob.mx/contenido/cuencas_jalisco/)
from the Comisio
and “La cuenca en datos,” La Gaceta, April 27, 2009 (http://www.gaceta.udg.mx/la-cuenca-en-datos/).

district, for example, small private landholdings increasingly competed with ejidos for water after the agrarian reforms of the 1930s.
This inflamed private property advocates, especially the Cristeros and
Sinarquistas, two conservative groups based in rural western Mexico
who denounced the ejido as socialism. Ejidos, whose communal lands
were granted and administered by the federal government, were often
bastions of agrarian reform and state support. In one instance, the
construction of Tuxpan’s irrigation district resulted in smallholders
from Tuzantla losing access to water they had utilized “since time
immemorial.” Violence flared in the late 1930s as a result of tensions
like these. Hydraulic works, therefore, mobilized conflict as well as
water. Nevertheless, tecnicos viewed irrigation districts as ideal built
and natural environments that enabled the state to control rural production and people.7
The Lerma-Chapala-Santiago hydrological basin, in which Jalisco
n partly reside, reflected the tensions and contradicand Michoaca
tions witnessed in Tuxpan but on a greater scale (figure 3). The Lerma
River, which is one of Mexico’s most important rivers in one of the
nation’s most densely populated regions, already featured, according
to one Mexican official, an ecosystem “completely modified by
man.” Despite this, the state assured campesinos that new hydraulic
works would conquer rural Mexico’s age-old foes: resource inequality
and nature’s volatility. Seasonal rainfalls left western rivers flooded,
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then dry, reducing campesinos, in one tecnico’s words, to a “constant
desperate state.” Thus, new water works signified rural Mexico’s
“great salvational project.” Reality refuted rhetoric in western
Mexico, however, as publicly funded irrigation networks were devoted mostly to large northern farms and ejidos after 1940.8
The wartime Mexican state, focused on rural modernization and
export growth, viewed the mobilization of water and campesinos as a

boon to both. President Avila
Camacho devoted his administration’s
resources to mechanizing agriculture. He envisioned building vast hydraulic projects in northern Mexico to facilitate this goal and to encourage the resettlement of central-west campesinos there. Due to
immediate postwar demands, however, population redistribution via
water infrastructure remained, according to Adolfo Orive Alba, a
“radical solution.” With parts of Europe and Asia in ruins, the pressure to expand postwar production surged, exposing Jalisco and
n to renewed scrutiny. Jalisco’s administrative region led
Michoaca
the nation in total cultivated hectares and total production value in
pesos. Yet its production value per hectare lagged behind nearly every
other Mexican region. This was largely attributed to the small-scale,
rain-fed subsistence agricultural regimes that predominated in western Mexico.9
In this context, US scientists saw the destruction of traditional agricultural regimes as essential to the expansion of Mexican crop production. Culturally biased policies and attitudes, often fully
supported by tecnicos and Mexican political and scientific elites, defined binational technical assistance from MAP’s outset. The
Rockefeller Foundation’s assumptions were articulated in two early
and crucial conclusions rendered by MAP officials in 1944: most land
in Mexico was “useless” without irrigation, and most irrigation was
“wasted” by Mexican farmers. At the same time, Mexican Agriculture
 mez, a vocal advocate (and salesman) of irrigation
Secretary Marte Go
technology, observed negatively that 60 percent of arable land was
controlled by ejidos and small farms. As the postwar era began, binational technocrats were convinced that traditional land tenure was
an obstacle to Mexico’s economic development and global
integration.10
Mexican agriculture’s wartime modernization paved the way for a
boom in emigration to the United States driven by technology and
infrastructure. The increase in Mexican migrancy was not unwelcome, particularly for US officials. While seemingly counterintuitive,
increasing Mexican crop production via US technology served to
boost US corporate agriculture. Mexico had continued to require
imports of US grain after the war’s end, dismaying US officials fixated
on feeding war-torn Europe. Yet US grain shipments to Mexico were
explicitly sustained to ensure a reluctant Mexican government’s continued participation in the Bracero Program. In 1946, the US
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ambassador to Mexico warned that if the United States ended grain
exports to Mexico it was choosing “between the [Bracero] program
and generally good relations with Mexico and a stable Mexico and a
Mexico cooperating with us” and “a Mexico driven to hunger and
revolution.” In the eyes of US officials, then, expanding Mexican production achieved three strategic postwar goals: it decreased Mexican
grain demands, alleviated Mexican instability, and continued the
Bracero Program beyond its wartime parameters. Therefore, US efforts
to foment irrigation-intensive agriculture in Mexico were driven, in
no small measure, by a desire to sustain a foreign worker program
that provided cheap labor for an increasingly corporate US agriculture
regime.11

TRANSFORMING LAND TENURE AND
LANDSCAPES
n’s (1946–52) industrialization and develPresident Miguel Alema
opment policies transformed rural inequality, mobility, and environments more than any president since Porfirio Dıaz (1876–1911). In a
dramatic departure from the radical redistribution of natural resourn intensified the state’s post-1940 conservaces in the 1930s, Alema
tive turn by reforming water and land regimes primarily to benefit
private industry. His administration altered constitutionally mandated land parcel size and ownership restrictions, vastly expanded irrigation infrastructure, reformed farm credit, and encouraged the
redistribution of central-west campesinos to northern Mexico. To realn restructured Mexico’s hydraulic
ize these ambitious goals, Alema
works bureaucracy. In December 1946, the National Irrigation
Commission, founded in 1926, was reconstituted as the Secretariat of
Hydraulic Resources (SRH).12
The SRH’s elevation to a federal secretariat revealed the centrality
n’s rural development strategy and
of hydraulic technology to Alema
fueled unprecedented public works planning. Tecnicos explicitly
linked progress to irrigation networks, proclaiming the two
“indistinguishable,” while Mexican planners envisioned projects that
would irrigate millions of hectares. MAP officials depended on this
hydraulic revolution since experiments with hybrid crops in centralwest Mexico strictly involved irrigation. Moreover, the tenants of
Mexican irrigation districts were required, by contract, to only use hybrid seed engineered by MAP. Hybrid seed required irrigated water,
and these two expensive inputs compelled many campesinos to seek
farm credit.13
Hydraulic technology was integral to historic 1947 land reforms
that privatized Mexico’s national lands and destabilized traditional
n’s budget prioritized both large and small
land regimes. Alema
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irrigation works, with hydraulic spending increasing in orders of
n and Jalisco, for exmagnitude over previous decades. In Michoaca
ample, a commission was created for the Rio Grande de Tepalcatepec
basin, encompassing eighteen thousand kilometers. The project
aimed to construct multiple public works for irrigation, hydroelectricity, and, crucially, roads. And in small towns like Villa Guerrero,
Jalisco, small water works like the Boquilla Dam were built. With
n issued a
rapid infrastructure construction already underway, Alema
decree on September 7, 1949 that further undermined traditional
smallholder agriculture and land tenure. The law focused on irrigation dues, fees that campesinos often could not afford. It mandated
that debt from any unpaid dues was backed by the campesino’s own
land, thus facilitating dispossession. If campesinos failed to pay the
fees they were denied water, which in turn often resulted in hybrid
crop failure, leading to loan defaults on industrial chemicals, seed,
and/or machinery. With those debts backed by their land, the outcome for increasing numbers of campesinos was land loss.
Furthermore, due to the adoption of laborsaving machinery on large,
irrigated, and commercial farms, Aleman’s reforms aggravated rural
unemployment.14
The Rockefeller Foundation provided Mexican technocrats both
crucial financing and scientific legitimacy during this turbulent period of land privatization and consolidation. In 1947, the foundation’s Natural Sciences division devoted nearly 20 percent of its
global budget to MAP alone. That year, Nelson Rockefeller, at the
time a former US assistant secretary of state, bestowed the coveted
n’s agrarian reforms. He proclaimed
stamp of modernity on Alema
n administration had ushered in “a new era of progress
that the Alema
and development” in Mexico. Its embrace of irrigation and agricultural industrialization symbolized, to Rockefeller, “the road which
leads to rising standards of living and greater opportunity for the people of Mexico.”15
However, hydraulic and agricultural technologies, promoted as
agents of increased production and prosperity, were undermined by
Mexico’s increasingly volatile weather. Corn, the staple of rural
Mexico’s traditional rain-fed farms, was a case in point. Hybrid seed
developed by MAP, like the popular Rocamex V-7 variety, was engineered in central Mexico solely for irrigated lands. However, this seed
was sold throughout the country—to rain-fed farms as well as to irrigated ones—leaving campesinos more vulnerable to climate fluctuations than they had been growing criollo stock that had evolved in
each region. This became readily apparent when a widespread, yearslong drought contributed to extremely poor crop production
throughout Mexico in 1949. The drought hit central and northern
Mexico the hardest, fueling emigration to the United States. This
drought also strained groundwater reserves, compelling Jalisco
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campesinos near Lake Chapala, Mexico’s largest freshwater lake, to imn to install pumps to “avert disaster.”16
plore President Alema
Crucially, the rapid growth of infrastructure during the 1940s generated environmental and social change in western Mexico.
Hydraulic works reduced water levels, altering lake and riverbeds.
n, Jalisco, left farms in former lake beds prone
New works near Etzatla
n’s
to flooding and drought, often ruining campesinos’ crops. Alema
reforms permitted the sale of newly drained national lacustrine and
riparian lands, resulting in their privatization and consolidation, often by foreign interests. Additionally, new rural road infrastructure
destroyed trees that prevented topsoil loss and reduced runoff.
n and Jalisco exhibited some of
Indeed, farmland in both Michoaca
the nation’s worst erosion by the century’s end. New roads also
helped spread agrochemical use. Between 1950 and 1960, nitrogen,
phosphorus, and potassium usage grew by a factor of fourteen, while
pesticide usage increased by nearly a factor of nine in a similar period.
As expensive industrial inputs were adopted and often misapplied,
western campesinos were compelled to endure the effects of polluted
water and soils.17
Hydraulic infrastructure fueled emigration in postwar Mexico by
dictating MAP research and Mexican development. By 1950, most hybrid wheat—a MAP priority—was grown on large farms and ejidos in
northwestern Mexico, where vast hydraulic projects irrigated the
land. Small rain-fed farms, which continued to dominate agriculture
nationally, primarily grew corn, especially in western Mexico. By devoting government and natural resources to export-oriented, irrigated crops like wheat, to the exclusion of subsistence, rain-fed crops
like corn, MAP and Mexican policies helped mobilize western campesinos northward. This fulfilled a key tenet of the tecnicos’ post-1940 rural modernization strategy. However, campesinos, often indebted due
to costly inputs or displaced by land consolidation and mechanization, did not settle in the northern Mexican irrigation districts as
envisioned. New highways linking western and northern Mexico,
lined with bracero recruitment centers, also led to the US border,
drawing migrants upward to higher-paying US jobs like capillary action (figure 4).18
The Cold War increasingly politicized rural Mexican industrialization. In 1950, MAP became part of the Point IV Program, a new US
technical assistance program created to reduce communism’s appeal
globally. According to US President Harry Truman, Point IV provided
“qualified experts” to foreign governments “to advise and assist on
development problems.” The Rockefeller Foundation embraced its
new Cold War directive. Foundation President Warren Weaver, contradicting MAP’s wartime humanitarian pretenses, reminded his scientists that the Rockefeller Foundation had begun work in Mexico
primarily for political and scientific purposes. MAP, in fact, laid the
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Figure 4. Major bracero recruitment centers in Mexico in 1960. The arrows indicate from left to right:
n,
Mexicali, Baja California; Empalme, Sonora; Durango, Durango; Guadalajara, Jalisco; and Leo
Guanajuato. Credit: Map by author, based on a map found in Bernardo Garcıa Martınez, Las carreteras
de Mexico, 1891–1991 (Mexico City: Secretarıa de Comunicaciones y Transportes, 1992).

scientific and ideological groundwork for Point IV. It had been tasked
with Americanizing not only Mexican agriculture but also Mexican
scientists, values, and peoples since 1943. Now, with the Point IV
Program, US officials contended that only US technology could help
the world’s developing nations overcome food shortages and resource
inequality.19
Under Point IV, the Rockefeller Foundation aggressively promoted
agro-technology to the detriment of Mexico’s balance of trade and
environment. In 1942, Mexico had imported nearly twelve million
tons of equipment worth almost thirty-two million pesos. By 1948,
imports reached nearly ninety million tons worth almost four hundred million pesos. By 1950, US machinery and chemical salesmen
overran the Mexican countryside. MAP Director George Harrar complained that he could not get any research done on the experimental
farms since he was always dealing with “the usual succession of representatives of fertilizer, insecticide, fungicide, seed and book
companies.” Meanwhile, a Rockefeller Foundation film asserted that
Mexico suffered from the “cancer of erosion,” whose only solution
was US “knowledge and experience.” The film showed nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorus being mixed into fertilizer cubes, while campesinos, lacking protective gear, sprayed insecticide. By 1951,
financially and environmentally costly inputs like these contributed
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to Mexico having one of Latin America’s largest trade deficits with
the United States.20
As more US technology flowed into, and modified, rural Mexican
landscapes, more campesinos flowed out. Their migrations were facilitated by US farm lobbyists who swarmed the US embassy in Mexico
City, exerting pressure on diplomats to continue the Bracero
Program. Technology and extreme weather increasingly worked in
US corporate agriculture’s favor. One campesino recalled heavy rains
causing a dam to fail in Jalisco, flooding multiple ejidos’ crops.
Mexican officials had no other recourse than to give these ejidatarios
bracero permits. Similarly, in 1951, irrigation works in northwestern
n left some farms dry and others flooded. Mexican critics inMichoaca
creasingly linked mass bracero emigration to the inequities generated
by the hydraulic and agricultural regimes promoted by MAP. One
journalist noted that many western ejidatarios lacked “water for irrigated cultivation” and “resources to work their parcels,” forcing them
to “abandon” their lands to work in the United States.21

CEMENTING RURAL INEQUALITY AND
MIGRANCY
Campesinos historically viewed their environments in terms of natural resources to be both exploited and preserved. Yet the rapid transformation of Mexican landscapes via the expansion of hydraulic
infrastructure radically altered campesino perceptions of the land as
well as the land itself. By the early 1950s, for instance, Jalisco campesinos who had once viewed lakes in terms of their traditional uses now
perceived fertile cropland being wasted. In 1953, one such group
demanded that the state build hydraulic works to drain Lake
Magdalena so that they could cultivate the lakebed. Lake Chapala,
n, was particularly vulnerable
bordered by both Jalisco and Michoaca
to modern technology and ideology. Its levels dropped precipitously
in the 1950s due to water works that diverted the Lerma River’s flows.
In fact, some western Mexicans advocated draining the nation’s largest lake completely, asserting it was more valuable “without water.”22
President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952–58) continued his predecessors’ commitment to irrigation expansion and land privatization and
consolidation. Consequently, from 1950 to 1960, the number of cultivated hectares in Mexico grew by 27 percent to nearly fourteen million. Traditional land regimes continued to receive intense scrutiny,
with the Rockefeller Foundation blaming the “excessively small size”
of Mexican landholdings for production woes in 1952. Ejidal land,
which was constitutionally prohibited from sale or rental, was increasingly rented out under Ruiz Cortines, which effectively consolidated and disentailed it. Ejidatarios were also often left unemployed
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due to the mechanization of their former parcels. Those who did retain use of their lands were often denied farm credit and inputs since
their parcels were deemed to be too small for public or private investment. Adding insult to injury, ejidos were frequently the preferred
sites for new roads and highways, which facilitated the downward
and spatial mobility of ejidatarios.23
As MAP’s influence swelled in the mid-1950s, cracks also widened
in its relationship with the Mexican state. Rockefeller Foundation scientists resented tecnicos’ grandstanding and self-promotion. They
claimed that Mexican officials, emboldened and enriched by the
rapid expansion of the country’s economy in preceding years (known
as the “Mexican Miracle”), increasingly claimed primary credit for
MAP’s successes. According to the Rockefeller Foundation, Mexico’s
Green Revolution remained highly dependent on US technology and
expertise since Mexican farmers in 1954 were still not producing
enough food for an “adequate diet.” Complicating relations further,
Mexico was outraged by the mistreatment of its braceros and undocumented migrants in the United States, viewing mass deportations as
an affront to Mexican pride and sovereignty.24
As binational relations deteriorated, the Rockefeller Foundation devoted more time and resources into getting engineered seed and industrial inputs adopted by Mexicans. A key MAP priority in 1954 was
training campesinos in Jalisco in proper fertilizer usage. Fertilizer use
spread rapidly throughout Mexico’s central plateau from 1950 to
1965 due to greater extension efforts, promotion, and credit, with the
n’s wet regions.
greatest growth seen in Jalisco’s and Michoaca
Though fertilizer was originally intended for irrigated, large-scale,
and mechanized commercial farms, small-scale rain-fed farmers eagerly adopted it. As a result, dollar remittances sent home by bracero
and undocumented migrants in the United States frequently paid for
industrial inputs for their own farms. Campesinos accustomed to saving their best criollo corn for the ensuing year’s seed found that expensive MAP hybrids lost potency in their second generation,
requiring annual repurchase. And hybrid corn and wheat varieties
were delicate and cross-pollinated easily with existing strains, decreasing their efficacy and yields.25
By the late 1950s, both the unpredictability of rainfall and the rise
in wheat production increased pressures on western campesinos to
emigrate. Poor corn harvests led the government to privilege wheat
n in 1957, with some local offiproduction in Jalisco and Michoaca
cials even promising the free use of machinery for wheat farmers. But
hybrid wheat, engineered to produce greater bushels per acre, grew
densely packed and required large amounts of water, which bred
more fungi and insects, requiring more pesticide. When the costs of
industrial agriculture were tallied, the Rockefeller Foundation’s own
experts conceded, farming in Mexico resembled an “engineering
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venture” requiring “substantial capital investment.” Therefore, medium and large landholdings enjoyed the lion’s share of statecontrolled credit and water resources. This left campesinos largely dependent on US migration and dollars (or migration to Mexico’s urban
centers) as their primary strategy to support their small farms.26
The environmental and social tolls of hydraulic industrialization
intensified during the 1950s. Profligate use of pumping by large,
mechanized farms depleted groundwater reserves (especially in
northern Mexico), poor drainage and excessive salinity rendered land
useless, and the overapplication of fertilizers damaged soil fertility.
Ironically, then, technologies promoted by MAP decreased the land’s
natural productivity in the long run. It was no coincidence that the
term of President Ruiz Cortines witnessed the apex of legal bracero
migration—over 445,000 US admissions in 1956. The reciprocal
growth of hydraulic and road networks in western Mexico presented
campesinos with an existential quandary. Infrastructure increased spatial mobility, yet reduced economic mobility, within rural Mexico. By
migrating to the rural United States, campesinos’ economic mobility
expanded, while their spatial mobility was severely restricted (legal
braceros) or outlawed entirely (undocumented migrants). Both scenarios, however, resulted in Mexican migrants’ exclusion from full
political, economic, and social inclusion in either nation.27
Investments in new highways and roads helped fuel the Mexican
Miracle, and hydraulic works continued to drive Mexican road building into the late 1950s. As a consequence, western Mexican landscapes came to be defined by extreme fluidity in terms of irrigated
water, social and environmental instability, and spatial mobility.
n represented a case in point. One survey boasted that
Michoaca
n’s capital, Morelia, and its hinterland featured “a magnifiMichoaca
cent road network” linking it to Jalisco and central Mexico. Multiple
n’s Zamora region, connecting Guadalajara
roads traversed Michoaca
and the US-Mexico border to vast tracts of land “appropriate for
mechanized farming.” The state was praised for its supply of abunn represented the ideal
dant cheap labor. In theory, then, Michoaca
environment for industrialized agriculture. In practice, however, water, road, and agricultural technologies made the state ripe for mass
out-migration.28

FROM INCREASING PRODUCTION TO
MITIGATING CONFLICT
Mexican agricultural production and hydraulic infrastructure increased dramatically in the decade and a half following MAP’s creation. From 1948 to 1958, Mexico experienced the world’s greatest
annual average increase in food production. By the latter year,
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two-thirds of Mexican irrigation works were massive projects constructed by the federal government. For the Rockefeller Foundation,
these results were proof of its policies’ efficacy and validated its view
that publicly financed irrigation should be reserved for the “better
farms” (large-scale, industrial) that controlled a quarter of Mexico’s
arable land. At the same time, the foundation reiterated its wartime
vow that it was not seeking to produce grain surpluses for export or
profit. Yet MAP’s former director, George Harrar, viewed surpluses as
beneficial since they boosted other Mexican industries, transportation most of all.29
When US scientists like Harrar claimed that agricultural industrialization drove economic and spatial mobility, they based this view on
US statistics. By 1960, the western and southwestern regions of the
United States were epicenters of corporate agriculture. In the West
particularly, vast road and hydraulic networks permitted higher population densities and more intensive agriculture. According to US
data, these irrigated regions contained more hard-surface roads and
more highly developed highway systems than rural regions lacking irrigation. In the United States, irrigation directly correlated with better
roads, higher farm production, and greater spatial and upward mobility. Because MAP had not brought similar benefits to Mexico, the
Rockefeller Foundation’s inability to fully graft modern US technology onto traditional Mexican agriculture left technocrats like Harrar
increasingly cynical about MAP’s future.30
The perceptions of the Rockefeller Foundation and US experts like
Harrar were crucial to both Mexican and world history since they ultimately shaped global development and landscapes. Harrar’s career
and ideological trajectories reflected this fact. Harrar, MAP’s first director in 1943, was promoted in 1955 to the position of Rockefeller
Foundation Director of Agriculture overseeing research worldwide. In
1961, Harrar was named interim, then permanent, Rockefeller
Foundation president. His intimate knowledge of MAP informed the
foundation’s dramatic shift that began in the early 1960s. Under his
leadership, the foundation’s mission evolved from using US technology to feed people in developing nations to utilizing US technology
to curb their reproduction. By reducing population, the Rockefeller
Foundation hoped to alleviate global hunger and resource inequality,
thus minimizing the appeal of communism during the Cold War.31
As the Cold War progressed, Harrar grew more assured of US technology and the campesino’s inability to benefit from it. Reflecting on
the late 1950s, Harrar admitted that the campesino still overwhelmingly maintained traditional agriculture practices and “did not have
the knowledge, the materials, nor the capital to increase the productivity of his land by modern means.” In 1961, Harrar added: “You
don’t give a man a very complex diesel tractor if he’s only been a
mule man all of his life.” And, years later, the Rockefeller Foundation
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president blamed rural inequality on the campesinos themselves:
“There is really no way to expect that the untutored . . . small farmers
who haven’t had the benefits of education can take maximum advantage of . . . better seeds, disease and pest control” and “better systems
of irrigation.” Harrar had taken this technologically deterministic
view of traditional Mexican agriculture and applied it globally. The
best hope for developing nations was not only to increase production
but also to reduce population. In practice, this philosophy was not
much different than the one that had guided MAP in previous decades. US technologies had performed a population control function in
rural western Mexico by cultivating a culture of migration to the
United States.32
As rural Mexican infrastructure, production, exports, and environmental change grew in the early 1960s, familiar conflicts flared anew.
Despite nearly two decades of MAP’s intervention, a comprehensive
regimen of hybrid seed, agrochemicals, and irrigation remained unknown on most small private farms and ejidos in Jalisco. Campesinos
continued to depend on traditional rain-fed agriculture. With land
increasingly altered by hydraulic works, and as rainfall grew more erratic while more water was captured for irrigation storage, rural violence erupted. To make matters worse, Mexican experts noted
“alarming” salinity levels in many irrigation districts. In this context,
n warned the SRH that “extremely grave
one group from Michoaca
conflicts” would erupt with the ejidatarios controlling their area’s water supply unless it stepped in. In response, the SRH began planning a
new, massive hydraulic project for the Lerma River.33
MAP concluded as the Lerma Project began, leaving a lasting legacy
in Latin America and beyond. Rockefeller Foundation President
Harrar and Mexico’s agriculture secretary signed an agreement finalizing the foundation’s withdrawal in 1961. By then, nearly half of the
foundation’s funds devoted to Latin American agricultural science
over the previous two decades had gone to Mexico. Millions of dollars
had been spent training tecnicos in US universities. MAP staff (and
assumptions) were transferred to developing countries where the
Rockefeller Foundation’s agricultural and population control technologies reaped controversial results. Although the foundation’s focus shifted away from Mexico, its core mission never wavered, sowing
fertile ground for US science, values, and exports globally. The USbased Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) quickly filled the
foundation’s void as the dominant financial and technical force in rural Mexican and Latin American industrialization.34
The IDB, a multilateral finance system created in 1959 and controlled by the United States, intensified technological and environmental change in Mexico like the Rockefeller Foundation before it. In
1962 the IDB demanded, as a prerequisite for the Mexican government to receive credit to finance new hydraulic works, that industrial
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inputs like fertilizer and hybrid seed be utilized on all ensuing irrigated lands. Consequently, the funding proposal for the Jalisco Plan
(part of the wider Lerma Project) projected a five-year investment of
$150 million for hydraulic works. Yet only $60 million were allocated
for hydraulic infrastructure, while $55 million were earmarked for
“agricultural inputs, including credit for seeds [and] fertilizers.” In
the early 1960s, Mexican officials, awash in US funding and facing rural unrest, doubled down on the technologies driving rural inequality
and environmental change.35
The SRH proclaimed that the Lerma Project and the Jalisco Plan
were designed to keep braceros and undocumented migrants within
 pez Mateos (1958–64)
rural western Mexico. Yet President Adolfo Lo
continued his predecessors’ boosterism of demographic mobility via
water infrastructure and land reform. These policy contradictions
were shaped by the changing political climate in the United States,
including the end of the Bracero Program in 1964. Facing a potential
influx of returning migrants to central-west Mexico, and flush with
IDB financing, tecnicos planned a larger wave of public water works to
mitigate anticipated conflict, despite the fact that hydraulic technologies had fueled land loss, job loss, and violence in the past. Officials
were bolstered by data showing that Mexico’s irrigated acreage had
risen from two million in 1946 to 6.2 million by 1963, allowing farmers to export seventy-two thousand tons of wheat in 1963. But corn
production, which was far more vital to western campesinos’ lives,
proved more erratic. Rockefeller Foundation observers blamed the
disparity between wheat and corn yields on the reluctance of these
“small-scale farmers” to adopt modern agricultural techniques and
inputs.36
By 1964, the main constant in rural Mexican development was contradiction. Water works were viewed as the primary solutions to the
very inequality and conflict that they were known to aggravate.
Irrigation infrastructure, promoted as the answer to climate volatility,
had precipitated environmental change and intensified its effects.
Industrial agriculture, hailed as the modern road to higher living
standards, frequently led to downward mobility for campesinos. The
Lerma Project embodied these inconsistencies in western Mexico.
After decades of rapid infrastructure and economic growth, Mexican
officials faced the mass return of the people who had borne much of
the burden of modernization: rural migrants. Mexican analysts noted
that jobs had to be created in the Lerma basin, “one of the greatest
sources of braceros,” given that the program’s end heralded “intense
social conflicts.” Therefore, after two decades of binational cooperation, billions of dollars of debt, and nearly 4.5 million bracero migrations, rural inequality in western Mexico had changed little. Rural
livelihoods, migrancy, and landscapes, however, had changed
forever.37
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CONCLUSION
For campesinos, the effects of land tenure reform and agricultural industrialization were mixed and numerous. By 1969, half of Mexico’s
farms still grew native corn despite two decades of MAP research and
extension. In total, 57 percent of cultivated land in Jalisco remained
in ejidos and 45 percent of arable land grew corn and beans, with vast
segments of the state featuring rain-fed regimes. Only 16 percent of
corn-sown land grew hybrids, while most corn was grown on “small,
rain-fed plots,” with research revealing little difference in yields between hybrid and criollo seed. Results were similar in countries where
the Green Revolution took root, like India, where a decade of wheat
research and extension resulted in only a third of cultivated land using irrigation by 1980. Yet Harrar maintained that the Rockefeller
Foundation’s “most fundamental contribution” to global agriculture
was providing foreign peoples with the technology to break out of
the “fatalistic farm patterns of the past.” This assessment contradicted
reality in post-1965 Mexico. As Mexicans began an unprecedented
and largely undocumented phase of labor migrancy to the United
States, the Green Revolution’s “most fundamental contribution” to
rural Mexican society had proven to be transnational migration.38
The relationship between bracero-era hydraulic and agricultural industrialization, environmental change, and transnational migration
is clear today. From 1940 to 1964, however, Mexican and US technocrats ignored Green Revolution technology’s effect on downward and
spatial mobility as yields increased. Between 1945 and 1970, production on Mexico’s industrial farms increased by 22 percent. By 1970,
Mexico produced four times more wheat than it had in 1945. In fact,
MAP’s former wheat research director, Norman Borlaug, was awarded
the Nobel Prize in 1970 for his work in India. In a Rockefeller
Foundation film chronicling the Green Revolution, which was released that same year, Borlaug vowed that this industrial agricultural
regime was “as Mexican as tortillas, refried beans, and chile.” He spoke
of social justice and how the people of the world deserved to “live
decently.” Yet the nearly three hundred thousand Mexicans deported
from the United States that year, most from central-west Mexico, contradicted Borlaug’s benevolent assessment of US technology. Rapid
hydraulic infrastructure expansion had irreversibly altered landscapes
and livelihoods in Mexico. It was only fitting then that, as Borlaug delivered his final thoughts on science, development, and humanity,
the camera slowly zoomed out to reveal the agronomist seated in
front of a vast Mexican reservoir—both a symbolic and concrete testament to hydraulic technology’s role in building an emigrant
Mexico.39
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